Affichage des articles dont le libellé est English. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est English. Afficher tous les articles

Toward a new geopolitics of climate for 2030

With less than 60 days to go before COP21, last week marked an important step on the road to a new climate agreement: the 196 participants had until October 1 to share what post-2020 climate actions they intend to take under the future agreement. Three-quarters of the world countries published their “Intended nationally determined contribution”, or INDC, in time.

Through this mountain of documents, it is possible to see the map of a profoundly changed world (1), a world where India emits three times more greenhouse gases than the United States and where an average European pollutes less than an Indonesian.
The INDC offers an image of our world in 15 years. If he wants to stabilize the climate in the coming decades, it is on these perspectives, and not on the current situation, that the Paris agreement must be negotiated.

(This article is translated from the original in French: Une nouvelle géopolitique du climat pour 2030)


Middle East and oil producers tempted by resistance


Let's start with those who did not submit their INDC: 47 countries exactly. Approximately one half can be excused: no one will blame South-Sudan or Micronesia if they did not find the time or the means to prepare thorough contribution.
In the other half, those whose absence shows reluctance to do their part, we can find almost all Middle East and many oil producing countries. All members of OPEC but two (Algeria and Ecuador) did not submit in time. Egypt, Syria or Pakistan did not either. It just takes a look at a map to understand that the weak spot of climate change mitigation is now somewhere between the Nile and the Indus...

This is not a coincidence, rather the consequence of international negotiations that intend to regulate a by-product of fossil fuels, carbon dioxide emissions, without any regard for the production and trade of coal, oil and gas. This contradiction will have to be solved sooner or later…
The same cause can explain poor contributions from other fossil fuel producers such as Australia and Canada that will remain among the most polluting per capita (respectively 15.3 and 13.6 tonnes CO2 equivalent per capita in 2030).


The emergence of two super-polluters


The other important lesson from the analysis of the INDC is the emergence of China and India as first global emitters, and by far. In 2030, China is expected to emit about 14 billion tonnes CO2 equivalent and India a little more than 9GtCO2e. That means that these two countries will emit as much as the whole world in 1990! United States will be on the third stand of the podium, but far behind with 3.6GtCO2e.

These levels can be partly explained by the huge population of the two countries. But even per capita emissions are expected to grow dramatically: 10 tonnes CO2 equivalent for an average Chinese in 2030, nearly as much as an American the same year, and 6tCO2e pc. for an Indian... Three time more than today!

Evolution of GHG emissions per capita for the 10 largest emitting countries between 1990 and 2030

In 1997, the main goal of the Kyoto Protocol was to reduce emissions from industrialized countries; neither China nor India had any obligation. Today the world has changed: If we really want to cut emissions over the next two decades, then all efforts must be focused on these two countries. If China or India agrees to decrease their projected emission by even a fraction of a percent it would have a much more significant impact than efforts from less emitting countries. Imagine, for example, that a decrease of only 0.5% of Chinese emissions in 2030 will be the equivalent of a drop of 15% in Australia!


New models?


On the other side, some countries have presented ambitious contributions. This is the case of Brazil that plans to divide its emissions per capita by two between 2010 and 2030 to reach 2.6TeqCO2 per capita - a level unmatched among other major polluters and especially remarkable for a country that has yet to develop.
The European Union also deserves to be quoted. Even if its proposal was subject of criticism, by 2030 a European will emit 5.7tCO2e, which is slightly less than an Indonesian the same year... We are still far from a level that would stabilize the climate but no other industrialized country displayed such ambition.

If they live up to their announcements, Brazil and the European Union could become new models in the fight against climate change. The former by showing the path of economic development without greenhouse gas emissions. The later by proving that a developed economy can be decarbonized while remaining prosperous.

(1) all the figures used in this article are derived from my own calculations on the basis of the INDC. Details are available in this article (in French).


For other posts on climate and energy from this blog translated in English, click here.


Germany, France, UK... A few tools to know everything about european electricity production.

Energiewende in Germany, transition énergétique in France, energy bill in Great Britain… European countries are overhauling their energy policies to face climate change and resources scarcity and to cope with their public opinion. In this context, electricity production statistics are becoming controversial: the percentage of nuclear in French mix or the dynamic of coal-fired electricity production in Germany may have huge political significance.
Unfortunately in many occasion it became obvious that policy makers ignore these data. One famous example in France is the 2007 presidential debate between Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy where neither of them was able to give an exact figure regarding the share of nuclear in French electricity generation (while of course accusing the other of being wrong). This example is really cartoonish, but the scenario is too common: energy debates often disregard facts and are reduced to an ideological confrontation.

Yet it is quite easy to fact-check affirmation regarding electricity generation. Power companies have made great transparency efforts and, provided you know the addresses and the available tools, you can know everything from the production of electricity in Europe minute by minute: how North Sea wind farms are performing right now? Is France currently importing or exporting electricity? What is the share of renewable energies in the German production today? The answers are here...

(This post was translated from the original in French : Comment suivre en direct la production d'électricité des principaux pays européens ?)


In France: RTE Eco2mix

The Eco2mix service is provided by the French electricity grid (RTE). It is available in English and gives a complete and ergonomic overview of the state of electricity production in France: instant production from each energy source, carbon footprint of one kilowatt-hour, trans-border flows... All these data are available with a 15 minutes pace over the last 3 months. In addition, a regional version was recently created.


In Germany and Austria

Data on the German electricity production are available on the portal of the Fraunhofer Institute, including daily production and spot price.
In addition, the European Energy Exchange, the energy market place for Central Europe, provides extensive data on the production of electricity in Germany, Austria and a few other countries.


In Great Britain

The British service shines by its comprehensiveness more than by its user-friendliness… But with a little patience you may find anything you can possibly want like the evolution of production by source, detailed wind generation or international flows.


In Denmark

Denmark is often praised for its energy policy. You want to check? Energienet, the Danish power grid, offers an interactive map on which productions and flows for both electricity and gas appear in real time.




In Spain

The Spanish grid, Red Electrica Espana, also provides a monitoring of the production from each energy source in real-time. Advantage of this service: it offers a remarkably long history as it is possible to find data for any day since 2007!


In Belgium

Elia offers lots of information but the real time tracking is available for wind and solar. For a complete picture, you can check the prevision at D-1 and the actual production at D+1.
More data are available from the European Energy Exchange.


For other posts on energy and climate from this blog translated in English, click here.

 

Backstage tour of the climate mobilization in France six months before the COP21

Since the beginning of the year, I am (almost) a full time observer of the preparations for the 21st United Nations conference on climate change (aka Paris Climate Conference or COP21). During the last 6 months, mobilization grew up and a few big events attracted the attention of the media, so that climate seemed to escape from the apathy it usually inspires and the COP21 became "bankable", sparking many vocations and civil society projects…
And of course this is just the beginning... the pace will continue to accelerate until the end of the conference in, almost exactly 6 months.

After I extensively wandered in this theater in construction and discussed with a large number of its actors, it seems interesting to give you an overview of the state of mind that prevails within the small community involved in the mobilization of civil society.

(This post was translated from the original in French : Paris Climat 2015, l'état d'esprit dans les coulisses de la mobilisation climatique à 6 mois de la COP21)


A small, relatively homogeneous community


But first let's set the scene: who are these people who busy themselves with the preparation of the COP21?

I was expecting to find a complex and somewhat chaotic network of actors and initiatives but it is rather a community organized in concentric circles with a hierarchy established by the access to information and decisions makers: the first layer consists of the crowd of activists, volunteers and enthusiasts who have virtually no influence. A second layer is formed by those among the previous who managed to open a few doors for themselves; they have access to backstage but do not play a significant role. The third consists of foot soldiers: project initiators, “chargés de mission”, employees from NGOs… they play an active role but their margins of manoeuvres are limited. Finally at the center there is a handful of "godfathers" (and godmothers) that can attract the attention of the media by their presence and open the doors of ministries and businesses by their recommendation, so that they almost always play a role, at some point or another, in successful initiatives (Nicolas Hulot is the archetype, but is not the only one).
Leaving aside the first two circles, one ends up with a surprisingly small community given the magnitude of the event: my guess would be approximately a hundred peoples.

The narrowness of this group has several consequences which surprised me during the last months. The main one is homogenization. Most people know and meet each other even though they represent positions that seem irreconcilable... And as there are few chosen, co-optation is often required to move from a layer to the next, leaving little room for new points of view and differing opinions. After all :

In short, if we stick to wording, everyone seems to agree: intentionally or not, the same talking points may be found in a NGOs meeting and in a coordination of big companies or used by young activists as well as old regulars who did not miss any UN conference since Rio...



Reminder of the objectives of the COP21: A binding agreement and 100 billion/year


What are these talking points? To understand them, we must first recall the objectives of the Paris conference.

The first objective of this Summit is to reach a new agreement on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (the previous agreement concluded at Kyoto in 1997 and entered into force in 2005 expired end of 2012), but not just any agreement... According to French presidency, Paris agreement should be:
  • Legally binding: it is not about good feelings and solemn promises… participants should agree on a text which once ratified will prevail upon their national legislation.
  • Universal: all countries should be concerned while the Kyoto Protocol only set reduction targets for industrialized countries (minus the United States that did not ratified and Canada who withdrew).
  • Able to limit the temperature rise to 2°C above the pre-industrial era: it is a commitment made at COP15 in Copenhagen. The figure of 2°C is fairly arbitrary but it represents a plausible limit below which humanity can still hope to adapt to the effects of global warming.

The COP21 has another important objective: allow developing countries to grow out of poverty while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. To do this, developed countries need to find 100 billions dollars per year for the Green Climate Fund (another commitment made in Copenhagen).


No one except the Paris Climate Conference to be a success...


Those are the objectives displayed by France, which will chair this conference. Are they realistic?

The answer to this question is clear: No. In all the interviews that I realized, I asked my interlocutors what they expect from the COP21, no one endorsed these goals. The most common opinion seems that the Paris conference will actually lead to an agreement, that it will perhaps be universal, probably not enough to stay below 2 ° C and certainly not binding.

Why? This pessimism reflects a widespread distrust of the UN process, but also geopolitical concerns. Russia is often cited: it could be tempted to make the international community pay for its position during the Ukrainian crisis by filibustering negotiations in Paris, especially as an efficient agreement would probably decrease fossil fuels consumption and further depress its economy. The United States arrive second in order of concerns: a binding agreement would require ratification by the Senate, and president Obama has neither time nor political capital to obtain it. If this were not enough, China is sometimes cited as opposed by principle to any binding agreement.

This pessimism is also explained by the still vivid trauma from the Copenhagen conference in 2009 (the infamous COP15). The context then was much more positive: financial crisis was not so bad after all, the Kyoto Protocol was still alive, Obama was brand-new, Sarkozy just had a huge environmental law passed and Merkel, even thought she expelled its former SPD allies from power, was confirming German ambitious commitment to renewable energies... Enthusiasm was perhaps too strong: everyone believed that the COP15 was the last chance and that the international community was going to – finally – take its responsibility… Copenhagen had to be the big day of the fight against climate change! And then nothing happened.
Greenpeace add during Coppenhagen conference
"Paris should not be a new Copenhagen", this is the watchword. To guard against a new disappointment, it seems that most of the participants have chosen to expect nothing from the UN conference, except maybe a sign that climate change still exists on the international agenda.


... But everyone is happy because there will be "a signal" and "solutions"


You think that with such prospects, the atmosphere must be sluggish? Think again: after these dark omens, your interlocutor will almost always add "but in fact it does not matter, what is important is the signal". Meaning that governments just have to pretend they care in order to push other actors - companies, communities, NGOs, etc. - to action.

What actions? Here come the “solutions” that the French Presidency put forward since the early stage of the preparation. This buzz word has been repeated and declined with zeal: Agenda of solutions, Solutions COP21, solutions crowdvoting... Even NGOs gladely joined the dynamics, although the most subversive ones indulge in a small semantic divergence: they are calling for “alternatives” as opposed to “false solutions”.

This rhetoric of solutions is certainly more effective than catastrophism to convince traditional opponents of climate policies. But it is in strong contrast with the urgency of the situation, and it also helps clear in advance the UN process: negotiations never venture on concrete topics such as renewable energies, transport or energy efficiency… These topics are within the boundaries of the sacrosanct State sovereignty and each country has to decide of its own policies. There are only 3 subjects discussed during a COP: emissions targets, financing and technology transfers. The declination in "solutions" is a matter for everyone... except negotiators and diplomats.

To be continued...

For other posts on climate and sustainability from this blog translated in English, click here.

Four timelapses to understand how our thirst for energy impacts the planet

The Landsat program provides free satellite images collected during the last 40 years. It is an invaluable resource for all those interested in the evolution of the planet. Among many possible observations, you can see for yourself how forests fade while agriculture and cities advance…
As for me, I am more interested by the environmental footprint of energy production especially oil, coal, gas, nuclear and hydro, five energies which provide 99% of the world consumption. I realized these timelapses representing 4 production facilities (I have not found interesting images for gas) between 1984 (the year I was born) and 2012.

(This post was translated from the original in French : Quatre timelapses pour visualiser l'empreinte de la production d'énergie sur l'environnement )


Coal: lignite-mining in East Germany


This square represents approximately 1000km². You can see a few mines of lignite (a type of coal largely exploited in Germany) in the former GDR on the border between Saxony and Brandenburg: Two mines, Welsow and Nochten, are still operating and devouring countryside others were abandoned and flooded.

Nuclear: uranium mines in Arlit (Niger)


This square of about 100km² shows one of the open pit mines operated by Areva in Niger. At the bottom right you may see the towns of Arlit and Akokan. A little further down (out of frame) lies another underground mine.

Oil: Athabasca tar sands (Canada)


This square of approximately 1600km² represents the spectacular extension of oil sands mine bordering the Athabasca River in Canada.

Hydropower: the Yacyretá dam (Argentina-Paraguay)


This square of approximately 5000km² shows the construction and impoundment of the Yacyretá dam on the border between the Argentina and the Paraguay. The reservoir covers 1600 km².

For other posts on climate and sustainability from this blog translated in English, click here.

Green, history of a colour.

What does green evoke to you? Nature? A political movement? Permission (with red as its contrary)? Islam? Is this colour positive or negative? Reassuring or alarming?
None of these questions has an easy answer: like all colours, green has a long history, complex and fascinating.

(This post was translated from the original in French: Vert, histoire d’une couleur)


How antiquity invented green


Just like blue, green rarely appeared in Greek texts. That is not a surprise: the vocabulary for colours was poor and inaccurate at the time. The same word could be used for colours that today seem quite different: glaucos, for example, may designate green, blue, gray and even some variations of yellow... It was not until the Hellenistic period (ie: after Alexander the Great) that a word unambiguously describes the colour of leeks… Green was born.

Unlike Greeks, Romans distinguished very well green from other colours, they called it virilis, derived from vir a root that is particularly fertile since it gives Latin words signifying branch, penis, virility, bravery ... However, with rare exceptions such as the taste of Nero for the emerald green, this colour was not popular: green was associated with Germanic barbarians and plebs.


An ambiguous colour in the middle Ages


In the early middle Ages, green gained respectability. Pope Innocent III, in his treatise on the Mass, made it a liturgical colour, the colour of ordinary ceremonies while red and white were for holidays and black for mourning. In the East, according to the tradition, Mohammed had a particular taste for green, his descendants (most noticeably Fatimid) adopted it as dynastic colour and ultimately it became the sacred colour of Islam at the end of Middle Ages.
Green was also seen as courteous and chivalrous: knights tournaments took place in a green environment, first in the countryside and later in cities where greenery was recreated. In addition, it symbolized young love, before the red of passion.

But these positive perceptions were not without nuances. Green is also the colour of the devil and his creatures: dragons, crocodiles, snakes, toads... are green. Witches as well: green eyes, and sometimes green skin, were indications of witchcraft. These beliefs still persist today: one in ten persons admits being afraid of the colour green or thinking it brings bad luck.

During the Renaissance, green is rare in everyday life. Like during the Roman area, it was considered as the colour of the people, commoners, peasants... Alceste, the misanthrope imagined by Molière and Don Quixote have in common to wear green ribbons but it is merely to display their contempt for fashion and show how little they regard the judgement others may have on them. One of the few historical characters that expressed taste for this colour was the king of France Louis XIII… in spite of Richelieu's efforts to change his mind.
The misanthrope wearing his green ribbons
This bad reputation may be related to the difficulty of obtaining and stabilizing green in painting and dyeing. An unstable colour, green logically symbolized what is changing or unpredictable: childhood, love, gambling... In addition, green pigment was often obtained from verdigris, a toxic copper oxide: at that time, wearing green clothes could actually bring bad luck!


Progressive rehabilitation in the eighteenth century


It the pre-Romantic period green came back in favour and it began to be identified as the colour of nature. This period saw a revival of landscape painting, as a result chemists learned to prepare beautiful greens for painters and, gradually, to use them in other areas such as furnishing and clothing. Green was especially appreciated by Napoleon, and his taste for the “vert empire” is perhaps the origin of the arsenic found in the Emperor’s hairs as draperies and wallpapers were often coloured with Paris green, a compound of copper and arsenic.

Green was even very close of becoming the colour of the French Revolution. On 12 July 1789, when Camille Desmoulins called the crowd to rebellion, he attached a linden leaf to his hat and green rosette quickly becomes the rallying symbol of insurgents. But, as they made their way to the Invalids to seize weapons, they learned that green was the colour of the brother of Louis XVI, a convinced counter-revolutionary that ultimately became king during the Bourbon restoration as Charles X. And green was abandoned by revolutionaries even before being fully adopted…
However, green remains as a symbol for fresh ideas and freedom. The use of red for ban and green for permission appears in the Lighthouses system at that time.

It is still possible to find traces from the negative meanings of the middle Ages during the nineteenth century. The green colour remained suspicious especially among women - during the Belle Époque prostitutes often wore green. Artists’ feelings were also mixed: impressionists frequently painted outdoors and used green without retained but it is rare among abstract painters. Kandinsky, for example, hated that colour.

It was not until the late twentieth century that green gained its current meaning and becomes almost unequivocally positive. With the development of ecological ideas, green acquired a new political dimension that he almost never had before. Nowadays, using green in ads or logo always announces an intention related to sustainable development. It is also a symbol of health (in France, green cross is the symbol of pharmacies) and fate (casino’s tables are usually green).
Today, green is the favourite colour of one in six persons, which puts it behind blue but far ahead of other colours.

The not-so-bright side of Energiewende: a tour of German lignite mines (with Google Maps)

You think German energy is about solar and nuclear phase-out? You are right but there is more… Did you ever hear about German lignite mines?
Germany has been the largest lignite producer in the world since the beginning of its industrial exploitation.  And it still obtains one-quarter of its electricity by burning this low-grade coal. But please, follow the guide…
(This post was translated from the original in French : Visitez les mines de lignite Allemandes avec Google Map)


What is lignite?


You certainly heard people saying that coal is the dirtiest fossil fuel. And well, lignite is the dirtiest coal...
Lignite, also call brown coal or soft coal, is a coal of recent formation. It can be found close to the surface which makes it simple to extract: you just have to dig a few tens of metres to reach lignite deposit. As a result, this coal is often exploited in open pit mines, causing the devastation of large areas.

In addition, the characteristics of lignite are significantly lower than those of other type of coal: a ton of lignite contains 30% less energy than a ton of bituminous coal. Its sulphur and ash contents as well as its moisture are higher than higher grades of coal.
Regarding greenhouse gases emissions, the arithmetic of lignite is fairly simple: the combustion of one ton of lignite emits one ton of carbon dioxide (and can produce one megawatt-hour of electricity).


Huge open-pit mines


The Ruhr valley, which remains the largest industrial area in Germany, is home to nearly two-thirds of the country’s reserves of lignite. Some of the most impressive mines in the world are located on the outskirts of Cologne, for example:
  • Hambach: It's the world deepest open pit mine: 293 meters below the sea level! It currently covers a little less than 35 km² and is expected to reach 85 km² at the end of its operation. Zooming in, you can easily see bucket-wheel excavators. These machines used to dig the ground day and night can be up to 100 meters tall and weigh more than 10,000 tons.
  • Garzweiler: This individual mine provides 6% of the German electricity. It was initially limited to an area of 66 km² but a new 48 km² area is being put into operation, requiring the dismantling of a nearby motorways. Eventually, this mine will cover an area larger than Paris.


On the map, you may easily notice other mines near Garzweiler, along the Erft River: Fortuna-Garsdorf, Bergheim, Frechen... Most are exhausted but still clearly visible. The city of Cologne to the right gives an idea of the scale.


A difficult conciliation with the environment


Other mines are located in former GDR, especially in Lusatia, south of Berlin:

  • Cottbus North: Located along the Polish border, this mine is famous for the trial which opposed Vattenfall, its Swedish operator, to the inhabitants of the nearby village of Horno. The trial was lost and the village destroyed. Atterwasch, Kerkwitz and Grabko, three other villages around the mine are also doomed. More than a hundred agglomerations disappeared that way: an old Nazi law, dating back to 1937 but still in force, put mining above private property... Beyond these villages, thousands of hectares of agricultural land are also lost.
  • Greifenhain: This mine, closed in 1968, is being progressively flooded. It should be completely filled with water in 2017. While water is a hazard during mining operations (it is not uncommon to divert a river to prevent it to flows into the crater), the creation of an artificial lake is a cheap solution to rehabilitate landscape once the mine is closed. Other flooded mines can be identified nearby thank to their unusual geometric shapes.


A little further to the West, Saxony offers another example of the difficult conciliation between lignite mines and their environment. The Schleenhain mine, opened in 1949, necessitated the destruction of the nearby village of Heuersdorf in 2009. Heuersdorf was home of the oldest fortified church of Saxony. In order to prevent it destruction, the 665 tonnes building was charged without disassembly on a specially designed truck and moved 10 kilometres away. The mine now threatens Röcken, the place where Friedrich Nietzsche was born and is buried.


In conclusion: no naivety on German energy policy


Lignite easily finds its place between tar sands and shale gas as a disaster for local environment. Navigate the map: you will see how German territory, especially Saxony, Rhineland and Lusatia, is eaten away by the lignite mining. Global consequences are less immediate and spectacular but they are also heavy: destruction of agricultural land, massive greenhouse gas emissions...

Germany is committed to an ambitious energy transition: phase-out from nuclear energy by 2022, rapid development of renewables... There is certainly much to learn from this experience. But one thing is clear: this policy is made possible thanks to the massive exploitation of a cheap and locally-available energy, lignite.


For other posts on energy and climate from this blog translated in English, click here.